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A TALE OF TWO SALES: HOW A SECRET SALE REMAINS A 
BAR TO PATENTABILITY UNDER THE AIA 
Kris Schroder 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Innovation and entrepreneurship are embedded into the history and 
fabric of the United States.1 It began with the founding fathers, some of 
whom were notable innovators, such as Benjamin Franklin2 and Thomas 
Jefferson.3 This tradition of innovation and entrepreneurship continued 
with individuals from Henry Ford4 to Bill Gates5 spearheading new 
technologies that would lead to drastic transformations to the United 
States economy.6 Intellectual property rights are one of the major forces 
driving innovation and entrepreneurship.7 Indeed, the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office states that its fundamental purpose is to 
“foster innovation, competitiveness, and job growth by recognizing and 
securing IP rights through the delivery of high-quality and timely patent 
and trademark examination and review proceedings.”8  
It is against this backdrop of innovation and economic growth that 
Congress passed a recent change to the patent law of the United States in 
 
 1. Entrepreneurs: The Backbone of American Economy and Society, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY 
(Nov. 29, 2018), https://online.rutgers.edu/blog/entrepreneurs-backbone-american-economy-society/ 
[https://perma.cc/6U3L-EPFH]. 
 2. Rex Hammock, Benjamin Franklin Never Sought a Patent or Copyright, 
SMALLBUSINESS.COM (July 1, 2014) (Benjamin Franklin had many inventions, such as bifocals, the 
lightning rod, and the Franklin stove), https://smallbusiness.com/history-etcetera/benjamin-franklin-
never-sought-a-patent-or-copyright/ [https://perma.cc/4ZLY-GYSQ]. 
 3. Rex Hammock, Thomas Jefferson’s Views on Patents and Intellectual Property Rights, 
SMALLBUSINESS.COM (July 4, 2014), https://smallbusiness.com/legal/thomas-jeffersons-views-on-
patents/ [https://perma.cc/RC8E-BN23]; see also Joe Kissel, The Inventions of Thomas Jefferson, 
INTERESTING THING OF THE DAY (Apr. 20, 2018), https://itotd.com/articles/2385/the-inventions-of-
thomas-jefferson/ [https://perma.cc/L5P7-K95B]. 
 4. Henry Ford, PBS: THEY MADE AMERICA (June 30, 2004), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/theymadeamerica/whomade/ford_hi.html [https://perma.cc/3FVW-XQG9]. 
 5. Bill Gates Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM (Apr. 2, 2014), 
https://www.biography.com/people/bill-gates-9307520 [https://perma.cc/8QB9-C9CC]. 
 6. James Titcomb, Windows 95 at 20: how Bill Gates' software changed the world, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 24, 2015, 3:47 PM), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/microsoft/windows/11817065/Twenty-years-ago-Microsoft-
launched-Windows-95-changing-the-world.html [https://perma.cc/YXY5-YULA]. 
 7. Lorenzo Montanari, IP Rights Promote Innovation and Prosperity, FORBES (Apr. 26, 2017, 
8:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenzomontanari/2017/04/26/ip-rights-promote-innovation-
and-prosperity/ [https://perma.cc/6UC5-5BZL].   
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the form of the America Invents Act.9 The America Invents Act was 
intended to help American entrepreneurs thrive by bringing their 
inventions to market faster.10 After its implementation into law, one issue 
involved the interpretation of a particular provision: does the addition of 
the phrase “otherwise available to the public” to 35 U.S.C. § 102 imply 
that the preceding collection of bars to patentability are public, or may 
those bars continue to stay private as the interpretations of the old statute 
had determined? This legal issue was argued in front of the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. 
USA, Inc.11 
Part II of this note will discuss the background of the on-sale bar within 
patent law, the relevant statutes before and after the America Invents Act, 
the intent of Congress when writing the America Invents Act, and a case 
analysis of Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. Part III of 
this note will argue that the Judiciary misread the intent of Congress and 
suggest a change to the statutory language. Part IV will summarize the 
note’s arguments and concludes that the proposed amendment will restore 
the intent of Congress. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to enact laws 
concerning the protection of intellectual property.12 The four main types 
of intellectual property rights in the United States are copyrights, patents, 
trademarks and trade secrets.13 For patents and trademarks, Congress has 
delegated this duty to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the 
“USPTO”).14 The patent system in the United States works in a quid pro 
quo fashion, in which the USPTO grants limited monopolies in the form 
of patents to inventors in exchange for a public disclosure of how the 
 
 9. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 10. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling 
the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs 
Create Jobs (Sep. 16, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim 
[https://perma.cc/HCZ3-NA82]. 
 11. 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019). 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
 13. Outline of the Legal and Regulatory Framework for Intellectual Property in the United States 
of America, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/info/outline/US 
[https://perma.cc/J93X-58J6]. 
 14. 35 U.S.C. § 1. 
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invention works.15 The idea behind this exchange is to incentivize 
innovation that will benefit society.16 Patents convey strong property 
rights to a patent holder.17 They allow the patent holder to exclude others 
from making the invention, using the invention, selling the invention, and 
importing the invention within the United States.18 Nevertheless, not 
every invention deserves these strong property rights.19 The USPTO 
requires that an invention be a process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter.20  Additionally, the invention must be useful,21 
novel,22 nonobvious,23 and it must be disclosed in the patent application 
sufficiently such that a person with adequate technical background could 
make and use the invention.24  
The novelty requirement has bars that must be avoided in order to 
obtain a patent.25 The statute for the novelty requirement, 35 U.S.C. § 102, 
was drastically changed when Congress updated the United States patent 
system with the adoption of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (the 
“AIA”) in 2011.26 In Section A, the novelty requirements under 35 U.S.C.  
§ 102 before the implementation of the AIA (“pre-AIA”) will be 
analyzed. In Section B, the novelty requirements will be analyzed under 
35 U.S.C. § 102 after the implementation of the AIA (“post-AIA”). 
Section C will highlight case law interpreting the on-sale bar pre-AIA. 
Section D will analyze amicus briefs and Congressional floor statements 
regarding the adoption of the new language in the post-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 
 
 15. See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) (“The tension between the 
desire to freely exploit the full potential of our inventive resources and the need to create an incentive to 
deploy those resources is constant.”). 
 16. James Evans, Remembering the Real Purpose of Patents, ACLU (Apr. 10, 2013, 10:44 AM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/internet-speech/remembering-real-purpose-patents 
[https://perma.cc/Z9NU-XGNV].   
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 271. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103. 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (requiring that the invention be a new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter). 
 21. Id. 
 22. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (requiring that the invention be novel and sets out various exceptions to prior 
art and bars to patentability). 
 23. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (stating that a patent may not be obtained if the differences between the 
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious 
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which 
the claimed invention pertains). 
 24. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring that a patent application “contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or 
joint inventor of carrying out the invention.”).   
 25. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 26. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284. 
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102. Section E will highlight the judiciary’s reasoning in an on-sale bar 
dispute between two pharmaceutical companies that culminated in the 
Supreme Court Decision Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.27 
A. Pre-America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 102 
The pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102 statute lists many requirements for 
novelty.28 In pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), there are bars to patentability 
for any invention that was (1) known by others in this country before the 
invention by the applicant, (2) used by others in this country before the 
invention by the applicant, (3) patented or described in a printed 
publication in the United States before the invention by the applicant, or  
(4) patented or described in a printed publication in a foreign country 
before the invention by the applicant.29 
Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) deals with bars to patentability by the 
inventor.30 These bars to patentability are: 
1. The invention was patented or described in a printed publication in the 
United States more than one year prior to the date of application, 
2. The invention was patented or described in a printed publication in a 
foreign country more than one year prior to the date of application, 
3. The invention was in public use in the United States more than one 
year prior to the date of application, and 
4. The invention was on sale in the United States more than one year prior 
to the date of application.31  
The language of this section is of particular importance for the public 
use and on-sale bar and has been the source of much litigation, which will 
be discussed in Section C.32 The pertinent language reads “... in public 
use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of 
 
 27. 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019). 
 28. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (Lexis 2010). 
 29. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Lexis 2010).  
 30. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Lexis 2010) (“(b)  the invention was patented or described in a printed 
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior 
to the date of the application for patent in the United States . . . .”). 
 31. Id.  
 32. See Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Patent claims 
invalidated based on “sales for the purpose of the commercial stockpiling of an invention” that “took place 
in secret”); Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S 55 (1998) (each detail of invention does not need to 
be disclosed in order for a sale to act as a bar.); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1 (1829); Smith & Griggs 
Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249 (1887) (“A single sale to another . . . would certainly have defeated 
his right to a patent . . .”); Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F. 3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (“Thus an inventor’s own prior commercial use, albeit kept secret, may constitute a public use or 
sale under §102(b), barring him from obtaining a patent.”). 
4
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application for patent in the United States . . . .”33  
Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) deals with abandonment of an invention.34 
Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) lays out a bar to patentability if an inventor 
applied for a foreign patent more than one year prior to applying for the 
patent with the USPTO and that foreign patent was issued before the 
application to the USPTO was filed.35 Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) lays 
out a bar to patentability in a situation where another individual describes 
the invention in a published U.S. patent or patent application before the 
invention by the applicant.36 Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) deals with the 
instance in which the applicant for a patent did not himself invent the 
subject matter to be patented.37 Finally, pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) 
describes interference proceedings, which occur in situations where there 
is a dispute between two applicants about who invented the subject matter 
first.38 
B. Post-America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 102 
The adoption of the AIA represented a drastic change to the patent 
system in the United States, as the system moved from a “first to invent” 
system to a “first to file” system.39 In a first to invent system, the law is 
more concerned with giving patent rights to the person who  invented the 
subject matter first, as seen in the various provisions of the pre-AIA 35 
U.S.C. § 102.40 In a first to file system, the law is more concerned with 
granting benefits to those inventors who disclose their invention first, 
allowing the public to benefit from the quid pro quo nature of the patent 
system faster.41 The change to the first to file system brought the United 
States closer to harmony with most of the other patent systems in the 
 
 33. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Lexis 2010).  
 34. 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (Lexis 2010).  
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (Lexis 2010).  
 36. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (Lexis 2010).  
 37. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (Lexis 2010).  
 38. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (Lexis 2010) (“In determining priority of invention under this subsection, 
there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the 
invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, 
from a time prior to conception by the other.”). 
 39. John Villasenor, March 16, 2013: The United States Transitions To A 'First-Inventor-To-File' 
Patent System, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2013, 11:54 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2013/03/11/march-16-2013-america-transitions-to-a-first-
inventor-to-file-patent-system/ [https://perma.cc/993N-58GX]. 
 40. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Lexis 2010).  
 41. Villasenor, supra note 39. 
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world, who also use a first to file system.42 
Post-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) reads: 
(a)  Novelty; prior art. A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-- 
(1)  the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed 
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the 
public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention;43  
Therefore, the current bars to patentability include: 
1. The invention was patented or described in a printed publication before 
the filing date of the claimed invention,  
2. The invention was in public use before the effective filing date, and  
3. The invention was on sale or otherwise available to the public before 
the effective filing date of the claimed invention.44  
Post-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) describes a bar to patentability in 
which the claimed invention is described in a patent or published patent 
application that was filed before the filing date of the claimed invention.45  
Post-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) describes the exceptions to these bars.46 
These exceptions include disclosures made within one year before the 
filing date by the inventor or by a third party who obtained the disclosed 
information from the inventor directly or indirectly.47 Additionally, when 
an inventor makes a public disclosure, that disclosure prevents subsequent 
third party disclosures from acting as bars to patentability of the 
invention.48 
When viewing the comparable sections in the post-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 
102 statute to the pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102 statute, Congress added the 
phrase “otherwise available to the public” to the public use and on-sale 
bars to patentability.49 It is up for debate whether Congress intended this 
additional language to cover unforeseen circumstances by which the 
claimed invention become available to the public, or if this was a 
clarification that the rest of the statute only applies when the claimed 
invention becomes available to the public. The question is then whether 
it is or is not implied that the on-sale bar should be for public sales only.50 
 
 42. Toshiko Takenaka, Harmony with the Rest of the World? The America Invents Act, 7 J. OF 
INTELL. PROP. LAW & PRACTICE 4 (Nov. 11, 2011), https://academic.oup.com/jiplp/article/7/1/4/870662 
[https://perma.cc/ZCY9-Z6AP]. 
 43. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (emphasis added).  
 44. Id.  
 45. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2). 
 46. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.  
 49. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (Lexis 2010); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).  
 50. The statute would then be read as, “or in public use, on sale [to the public], or otherwise 
available to the public . . . .” 
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C. The on-sale bar provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102 
The idea of an on-sale bar provision began to appear early in the history 
of the patent system in the United States.51 In Pennock v. Dialogue, the 
Supreme Court tackled an issue around the public use and sale of an 
invention before it was patented.52 The Court explained that “it would 
materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts” to allow an 
inventor to “sell his invention publicly” and later “take out a patent” and 
“exclude the public from any farther use than what should be derived 
under it.”53 In Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., the Supreme Court explained 
that “It is not a public knowledge of his invention that precludes the 
inventor from obtaining a patent for it, but a public use or sale of it.”54 
Only a single sale is needed to defeat the right of an inventor to a patent.55 
In Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
reasoned that the policy behind pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) was to 
encourage an inventor to enter the patent system promptly.56 Building on 
this reasoning, the court held that an inventor’s own prior commercial use, 
even if kept secret, constitutes a public use or sale and acts as a bar to 
patentability.57 
Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. described a situation in which an 
individual was marketing a computer chip that he had sketched out more 
than a year before he filed for a patent application.58 The Supreme Court 
held the patent invalid because the on-sale bar applied.59 The Court 
described two conditions needed for the on-sale bar to apply.60 First, a 
product must be subject to a commercial offer of sale.61 Second, the 
product must be ready to be patented.62 A product can be ready to be 
patented either by 1) having been reduced to practice in the form of a 
prototype or by 2) having prepared drawings or descriptions detailed 
enough such that a person having ordinary skill in the art would be 
enabled to practice the invention.63 
In Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., the Federal Circuit invalidated a 
 
 51. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1 (1829). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 19. 
 54. 97 U.S. 126, 136 (1877).  
 55. Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 257 (1887). 
 56. 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
 57. Id.  
 58. 525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
 59. Id. at 68-69. 
 60. Id. at 67-68. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
7
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patent due to the on-sale bar because the inventor had contracted with a 
supplier to mass produce and stockpile the product in secret more than 
one year before the patent application.64 It is important to note that in this 
instance the supplier and the inventor were not the same entity because if 
they were the same entity, the on-sale bar would not have applied.65 
The on-sale bar clearly applied to secret sales prior to the adoption of 
the AIA.66 However, the addition of the phrase “otherwise available to the 
public” into 35 U.S.C. § 102 has complicated the interpretation.67 
Supreme Court case-law provides guidance when interpreting statutory 
revisions. In Shapiro v. United States, the Supreme Court held that when 
Congress adopted language in a new legislative act that was used in a 
prior legislative act, Congress also adopted the judicial interpretation of 
such language and made it a part of the new legislative act.68 The Court 
in Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez held that “the doctrine of congressional 
ratification applies only when Congress reenacts a statute without 
relevant change.”69 In Paroline v. United States, the Supreme Court, in a 
5-4 decision, refused to extend the protection of a statute that had been 
reenacted without “language expressly suggesting Congress intended that 
approach.”70 The dissenting opinion by Justice Sotomayor reasoned that 
textual and contextual reasoning was enough to conclude Congressional 
intent in this instance.71 In Federal Maritime Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, 
Inc., the Supreme Court refused to extend a statute that had changed due 
to the context provided by the legislative history.72 
D. Congressional intent in the post-America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 102 
There are differing opinions in the legal world about how much weight 
legislative history should be given when interpreting a statute.73 On one 
hand, some attorneys worry that “a legislative history can allow for 
manipulation, meaning a judge can find what he or she is looking for 
 
 64. Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 65. Id. at 1357. 
 66. See Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
 67. 35 U.S.C. § 102.  
 68. 335 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1948). 
 69. 566 U.S. 583, 592-593 (2012).  
 70. 572 U.S. 434 453 (2014).  
 71. Id. at 477. 
 72. 411 U.S. 726, 735 (1973). 
 73. Lauren Mattiuzzo, Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation, HEINONLINE: BLOG (Mar. 
22, 2018), https://home.heinonline.org/blog/2018/03/legislative-intent-and-statutory-interpretation/ 
[https://perma.cc/RJ67-QJZ6].  
8
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within the documents.”74 Other attorneys, however, feel that “sifting 
through a legislative history will provide clarity to the original intent of 
the legislation.”75 Additionally, proposed legislation undergoes many 
amendments such that the final language may not adequately describe the 
intent of the legislators when there is disagreement.76 Here, the 
interpretation of the new statute was explicitly laid out in the legislative 
history. 77 As such, the legislative history should be given more weight. 
In the legislative history of the AIA, there are many interesting 
comments by members of Congress involved in drafting and amending 
the legislation.78 Senator Orrin Hatch and Senator Patrick Leahy were 
both quoted on the floor during an AIA clarification session.79 Senator 
Hatch was quoted as stating: “If a disclosure resulting from the inventor’s 
actions is not one that is enabled, or is not made available to the public, 
then such a disclosure would not constitute patent-defeating prior art 
under 102(a) in the first place.”80 Senator Leahy further clarified:  
One of the implications of the point we are making is that subsection 102(a) 
was drafted in part to do away with precedent under current law that private 
offers for sale or private uses or secret processes practiced in the United 
States that result in a product or service that is then made public may be 
deemed patent-defeating prior art. That will no longer be the case. In effect, 
the new paragraph 102(a)(1) imposes an overarching requirement for 
availability to the public, that is a public disclosure, which will limit 
paragraph 102(a)(1) prior art to subject matter meeting the public 
accessibility standard that is well-settled in current law, especially case law 
of the Federal Circuit.81  
The on-sale bar further appeared in other floor hearings discussing the 
AIA. Senator Jon Kyl from Arizona said:  
Another one of the bill’s clear improvements over current law is its 
streamlined definition of the term ‘‘prior art.’’ Public uses and sales of an 
invention will remain prior art, but only if they make the invention 
available to the public. An inventor’s confidential sale of his invention, his 
 
 74. Id. (citing Kenneth W. Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE 
L.J. 371, 379 (1987), 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/duklr1987&id=387&collection=journals). 
 75. Id. (citing Matthew B. Todd, Avoiding Judicial In-Activism: The Use of Legislative History to 
Determine Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 189, 222 (2006), 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/wasbur46&id=195&collection=journals). 
 76. Id. 
 77. 157 CONG. REC. S1496 (2011).  
 78. See generally 157 CONG. REC. S1496 (2011); 157 CONG. REC. S5319 (2011); 157 CONG. REC. 
S5431 (2011); 157 CONG. REC. H4429 (2011). 
 79. 157 CONG. REC. S1496 (2011).  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
9
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demonstration of its use to a private group, or a third party’s unrestricted 
but private use of the invention will no longer constitute private art. Only 
the sale or offer for sale of the invention to the relevant public or its use in 
a way that makes it publicly accessible will constitute prior art. The main 
benefit of the AIA public availability standard of prior art is that it is 
relatively inexpensive to establish the existence of events that make an 
invention available to the public. Under current law, depositions and 
litigation discovery are required in order to identify all of the inventor’s 
private dealings with third parties and determine whether those dealings 
constitute a secret offer for sale or third party use that invalidates the patent 
under the current law’s forfeiture doctrines. The need for such discovery is 
eliminated once the definition of ‘‘prior art’’ is limited to those activities 
that make the intention accessible to the public. This will greatly reduce 
the time and cost of patent litigation and allow the courts and the PTO to 
operate much more efficiently.82 
After the bill was passed to the House of Representatives and back in 
the ordinary legislative process, Senator Kyl, being involved in 
negotiations with the House of Representatives, also made clarifications 
about the final form of the AIA that relates to the on-sale bar provision: 
As Chairman SMITH most recently explained in his June 22 remarks, 
‘‘contrary to current precedent, in order to trigger the bar in new 102(a) in 
our legislation, an action must make the patented subject matter ‘available 
to the public’ before the effective filing date.’’ Therefore, ‘‘[i]f an 
inventor’s action is such that it triggers one of the bars under 102(a), then 
it inherently triggers the grace period in section 102(b).’’ When the 
committee included the words ‘‘or otherwise available to the public’’ in 
section 102(a), the word ‘‘otherwise’’ made clear that the preceding items 
are things that are of the same quality or nature. As a result, the preceding 
events and things are limited to those that make the invention ‘‘available 
to the public.’’ The public use or sale of an invention remains prior art, thus 
making clear that an invention embodied in a product that has been sold to 
the public more than a year before an application was filed, for example, 
can no longer be patented. Once an invention has entered the public 
domain, by any means, it can no longer be withdrawn by anyone. But 
public uses and sales are prior art only if they make the invention available 
to the public. In my own remarks last March, I cited judicial opinions that 
have construed comparable legislative language in the same way. Since 
that time, no opponent of the first-to-file transition has identified any 
caselaw that reads this legislative language any other way, nor am I aware 
of any such cases. I would hope that even those opponents of first to file 
who believe that supporters of the bill cannot rely on committee reports 
and sponsors’ statements would at least concede that Congress is entitled 
 
 82. 157 CONG. REC. S5319 (2011). Senator Kyl was one of the main proponents of the AIA, as 
such his interpretation that prior art should be limited to activities that make the intention available to the 
public is important. 
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to rely on the consistent judicial construction of legislative language. 
Finally, I would note that the interpretation of 102 that some opponents 
appear to advance—that nondisclosing uses and sales would remain prior 
art, and would fall outside the 102(b) grace period—is utterly irrational. 
Why would Congress create a grace period that allows an invention that 
has been disclosed to the world in a printed publication, or sold and used 
around the world, for up to a year, to be withdrawn from the public domain 
and patented, but not allow an inventor to patent an invention that, by 
definition, has not been made available to the public? Such an 
interpretation of section 102 simply makes no sense, and should be rejected 
for that reason alone.83 
In the House, there have also been discussions about the on-sale bar, 
such as the comments by Congressman Lamar Smith referenced by 
Senator Kyl above.84 
However, not all of the representatives in Congress agree with the 
interpretation. In her Amicus Brief for Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc.,85 Representative Zoe Lofgren from California 
summarized the secret on-sale bar’s opposition statement as: 
When Congress retained the phrase “on sale” without alteration in the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”), Congress clearly 
intended to preserve the meaning of the on-sale bar as it had long been 
judicially interpreted, including in many of this Court’s own cases. All of 
the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation point to that result, including 
the plain language of the on-sale bar and established canons of statutory 
construction. The legislative history surrounding the AIA does not 
undermine this result—it supports it. Congress considered several 
alternative bills to the AIA that would have achieved the result for which 
Petitioner now advocates: replacing the on-sale bar with a pure publicity 
standard. Yet Congress did not adopt the language of those proposals and 
chose instead to preserve the on-sale bar as it had previously existed. Both 
advocates and opponents of the on-sale bar contemporaneously 
acknowledged that retaining the bar also meant retaining its judicially-
defined meaning. It was only after opponents of the on-sale bar lost their 
bid to change the AIA’s text that individual members of Congress delivered 
floor statements (notoriously the least reliable form of legislative history) 
pressing a creative interpretation of the AIA’s ultimately-enacted language 
that would accomplish the very thing Congress had declined to do. 
Petitioner’s legislative history arguments rely on these isolated floor 
statements, ignoring the overall weight of legislative history and the 
traditional canons of statutory construction, all of which strongly favor 
 
 83. 157 Cong. Rec. S5431 (2011). Senator Kyl highlights that any contrary interpretation to the 
new 35 U.S.C. § 102 to the interpretation put forth by himself and Representative Smith would not make 
sense when the intent of the statute is considered.  
 84. See 157 Cong. Rec. H4429 (2011).  
 85. 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019). 
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Respondent’s position in this case.86 
Representative Lofgren argues that the addition of “otherwise available 
to the public” broadens the conduct that invalidates a patent and does not 
constrict the range of conduct that invalidates a patent.87 Going into 
further detail, Representative Lofgren states: 
[R]eading “or otherwise available to the public” to modify the list of 
established terms preceding it would be inconsistent with the canon of 
statutory interpretation that applies when determining whether Congress 
has changed the meaning of a term this Court has previously defined. 
Supra, at 5-7. As explained, this Court expects that Congress will “provide[ 
] a relatively clear indication of its intent” to change a statute’s meaning 
and disfavors “modification by implication.” TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 
1520 (quoting in part Madigan, 300 U.S. at 506). Yet “modification by 
implication” is precisely what Petitioner thinks Congress did. Petitioner 
would have this Court imply from the addition of the “or otherwise” 
language that Congress intended to modify the meaning of every judicially-
interpreted term of art preceding it, essentially a clandestine way of making 
sweeping changes to existing caselaw. That is flatly inconsistent with how 
this Court expects Congress to act when it legislates around its precedential 
decisions.88  
Later in the brief, Representative Lofgren alleges: 
Simply put, Rep. Lofgren offered her amendment to retain not only the 
words “on sale,” but also the meaning associated with those words, as they 
had been interpreted by this Court and the lower courts—indeed, that was 
the entire point of her amendment. Following her statement, Rep. Smith 
announced his support for Rep. Lofgren’s amendment and encouraged his 
colleagues to join him. Markup 102 (statement of Rep. Smith). Rep. 
Lofgren’s amendment passed, thus blocking the attempt to remove the on-
sale bar from the bill in Committee.89 
However, when going back to the markup, a different story appears: 
However, the related change in the manager's amendment goes beyond 
revising the grace period and also amends the definition of prior art in 
subsection 102(a). I have now heard strenuous concerns about the broader 
change from a wide range of stakeholders. In particular, they are concerned 
about the deletion of specific categories of prior art with well established 
meanings in case law and replacing those terms with a more ambiguous 
term otherwise disclosed to the public. Now, I understand that the chairman 
may be prepared to accept this amendment, and I would welcome that 
 
 86. Brief for Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 2, 
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019) (No. 17-1229). 
 87. Id. at 3. 
 88. Id. at 8.  
 89. Id. at 13-14. 
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without further debate. I am not offering an amendment to replace the 
section today because as we struggled to write something, it became clear 
in discussion with leg counsel that this is too complicated to draft in this 
time frame. 90 
The amendment that was agreed to by Representative Smith was an 
early amendment that automatically triggered the 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
grace period when a 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) bar was triggered, not an 
amendment dealing with the “otherwise available to the public” 
phrasing.91 Additionally, the manager’s amendment that Representative 
Lofgren was concerned about subsequently passed.92 Furthermore, nearly 
two months after the Representative Smith’s alleged agreement to 
Representative Lofgren’s interpretation of the on-sale bar provision, 
Representative Smith authored a report and stated: “Thus, in section 102 
the ‘in this country’ limitation as applied to ‘public use’ and ‘on sale’ is 
removed, and the phrase ‘available to the public’ is added to clarify the 
broad scope of relevant prior art, as well as to emphasize the fact that it 
must be publicly accessible.”93 Representative Smith has been consistent 
in this interpretation, stating in his Amicus Brief that “Most significantly, 
the term ‘available to the public’ in new § 102(a)(1) now functions as a 
terminal qualifier limiting prior art arising from ‘in public use’ or ‘on sale’ 
activities to what renders the subject matter defined by the patent claims 
available to the public.”94 
E. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. on-sale 
bar dispute 
The determination of whether the secret on-sale bar provision had been 
removed or retained came to a head in Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc.95 In Helsinn, a Swiss pharmaceutical company, Helsinn 
 
 90. America Invents Act of 2011: Markup of H.R. 1249 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112 
Cong. 101 (2011) [hereinafter Markup] (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren) (emphasis added), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/20110414-house_judiciary_mark-
up_transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5A8-2L2M]. 
 91. Markup, supra note 91, 102 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith). (“In that colloquy, the Senators 
discussed the scope of the grace period in the bill. Senator Leahy expressed his intent that, quote, if an 
inventor’s actions are such as to constitute prior art under subsection 102(a), then those actions necessarily 
trigger subsection 102(b)’s protections for the inventor, and what would have been section 102(a) as prior 
art would be excluded as prior art by the grace period provided by section 102(b).”). 
 92. Markup, supra note 91, 108 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith and Ms. Kish). (“Ms. Kish: ‘Mr. 
Chairman, 29 members voted aye; 2 members voted nay.’ Chairman Smith. ‘The majority having voted 
in favor of the manager's amendment, it is agreed to’”). 
 93. Markup, supra note 91, 42 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith).  
 94. Brief for Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 3, 
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019) (No. 17-1229). 
 95. 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019). 
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Healthcare S.A. (“Helsinn”), entered into a license agreement and a 
supply and purchase agreement with a Minnesota based company, MGI 
Pharma, Inc.96 The two agreements included the dosage information, but 
required MGI Pharma, Inc. to keep proprietary information confidential.97 
The agreements were announced publicly, but did not disclose the dosage 
information.98 Helsinn filed multiple patents relating back to the initial 
drug, the fourth patent being effective in May 2013.99 Teva 
Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. is an Israeli company and Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. is its American affiliate (“Teva”).100 They 
both manufacture generic drugs.101 Helsinn sued Teva for infringing the 
fourth patent relating to its drug.102 Teva claimed that the patent was 
invalid because the dosage was on-sale more than one year before the 
application was filed.103 
The District Court reasoned that the on-sale bar did not apply because 
“under the AIA, an invention is not ‘on sale’ unless the sale or offer in 
question made the claimed invention available to the public.”104 Since the 
public disclosure of the sale did not include the dosage, the court reasoned 
that the invention was not on sale.105 
The Federal Circuit reversed and explained that “if the existence of the 
sale is public, the details of the invention need not be publicly disclosed 
in the terms of sale” to come under the on-sale bar of the AIA.106 
Therefore, the on-sale bar applied according to the Federal Circuit 
because the sale of the drug was public. 107 The Federal Circuit relied on 
Medicines Co. v. Hospira, Inc.108 to make its decision.109 The court 
reasoned that the question of whether there was an offer for sale must be 
“‘analyzed under the law of contracts as generally understood’ and ‘must 
focus on those activities that would be understood to be commercial sales 
and offers for sale 'in the commercial community.’”110 The court then 
looked to the Uniform Commercial Code and determined that “A sale 
 
 96. Id. at 631.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 632 (citing Helsinn Healthcare S. A. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. Ltd., 387 F. Supp. 3d 439, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27477, 2016 WL 832089, *45, *51 (D.N.J., Mar. 3, 2016)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. 827 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 109. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 110. Id. 
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occurs when there is a ‘contract between parties to give and to pass rights 
of property for consideration which the buyer pays or promises to pay the 
seller for the thing bought or sold.’”111  
Other factors from Medicines that the court looked at include passage 
of title, the confidential nature of a transaction, and the presence of 
commercial marketing of the invention.112 In this case, those factors 
weighed against applying the on-sale bar.113 The absence of regulatory 
approval for a product in a sale does not preclude the on-sale bar from 
being triggered.114 Helsinn argued that the floor statements of Congress 
should be analyzed to determine the post-AIA 35 USC § 102(a).115 The 
Federal Circuit rejected this argument and declined to decide the case 
more broadly than necessary.116 The court reasoned that no cases were 
identified by the floor statements that would be overturned by the 
amendments.117 The court further explained: “Even if the floor statements 
were intended to overrule those secret or confidential sale cases discussed 
above … that would have no effect here since those cases were concerned 
entirely with whether the existence of a sale or offer was public.”118  
Helsinn additionally argued that the “otherwise available to the public” 
language requires that details of the claimed invention be disclosed before 
the on-sale bar is triggered.119 The court relied on a case from the early 
19th century, Pennock v. Dialogue,120 to determine that the on-sale bar 
still applies when the secrets of the invention are withheld from the 
public.121 The court reasoned that the floor statements must have intended 
for the public sale to put the patented product in the hands of the public.122 
The court cited a statement by Senator Kyl, in which he stated “once a 
product is sold on the market, any invention that is inherent to the product 
becomes publicly available prior art and cannot be patented.”123 The court 
further stated that there are no floor statements suggesting that the sale 
must publicly disclose the details of the claimed invention in order for the 
on-sale bar to apply.124 The court concluded by stating that if Congress 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1365. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1369. 
 119. Id. 
 120. 27 U.S. 1 (1829). 
 121. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 122. Id. at 1371. 
 123. Id. (citing 157 CONG. REC. 3423 (2011) (remarks of Sen. Kyl)). 
 124. Id. 
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wanted to make a drastic change to the on-sale bar, they would have done 
so by using clear language.125 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s judgment.126 The 
Court reasoned that “The new §102 retained the exact language used in 
its predecessor statute (‘on sale’) and, as relevant here, added only a new 
catch all clause (‘or otherwise available to the public’).”127 The Court did 
not consider the addition of “or otherwise available to the public” a strong 
enough reason to conclude Congress’ actual intention.128 The Court 
refused to read the addition as a modifier because the phrase “on sale” 
had acquired a well-settled meaning when the AIA was enacted.129 
Therefore, the court determined that  Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.130 
was still controlling.131 This ruling therefore meant that “on sale” was to 
be interpreted the same as the pre-AIA  35 U.S.C. § 102(a), which 
required that the invention was “the subject of a commercial offer for 
sale” and “ready for patenting.”132 Under Pfaff, each detail of invention 
does not need to be disclosed in order for a sale to act as a bar.133 The 
Court relied on Shapiro v. United States134 to adopt the presumption that 
“when Congress reenacted the same language in the AIA, it adopted the 
earlier judicial construction of that phrase.”135 
III. DISCUSSION 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the post-AIA 35 USC § 102(a) 
is seemingly at odds with the explicit intent of the main congressional 
supporters of the AIA.136 The Supreme Court reasons that the phrase 
“otherwise available to the public” did not affect the meaning of the post-
 
 125. Id. (citing Dir., OWCP v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 321, 103 S. Ct. 634, 74 L. 
Ed. 2d 465 (1983)). 
 126. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 632 (2019). 
 127. Id. at 634.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. 525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
 131. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 630 (2019). 
 132. Id. The invention can be shown to be ready for patenting by proof of reduction to practice or 
drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in 
the art to practice the invention.  
 133. Id. at 633. 
 134. 335 U.S. 1, 16 (1948) (“In adopting the language used in the earlier act, Congress ‘must be 
considered to have adopted also the construction given by this Court to such language, and made it a part 
of the enactment.’”).  
 135. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 139 S. Ct. at 633-34 (2019). 
 136. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 139 S. Ct. 628; 157 CONG. REC. S5431 (2011); 157 CONG. REC. 
S1496 (2011).  
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AIA 35 USC  § 102(a).137 However, Senator Kyl, Senator Leahy, and 
Representative Smith have argued that the addition of the phrase 
“otherwise available to the public” had the purpose of removing secret 
sales from the equation when considering the on-sale bar of the post-AIA 
35 USC § 102(a).138 This section argues that the Supreme Court was 
incorrect in its interpretation of the post-AIA 35 USC § 102(a) and 
suggests language that Congress could add to make its intent clear enough 
for the Supreme Court so that the interpretation is in line with the original 
Congressional intent of the AIA. 
A. The Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted post-AIA 35 USC § 102 
 The Supreme Court declined to read the addition of “otherwise 
available to the public” as a modifier because the phrase “on sale” had 
acquired a well-settled meaning when the AIA was enacted.139 The Court 
also determined that the language of the post-AIA 35 USC § 102(a) had 
the same judicial construction as the earlier pre-AIA 35 USC § 102.140  
However, the primary sponsors of the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act had a different interpretation. When discussing the addition of 
“otherwise available to the public” and its effect on the on-sale bar, 
Senator Leahy stated on the record that one of the goals of the revisions 
of 35 USC § 102(a) was “to do away with precedent under current law 
that private offers for sale or private uses or secret processes practiced in 
the United States that result in a product or service that is then made public 
may be deemed patent-defeating prior art.”141 Similarly, Representative 
Smith has been quoted in Congressional records as saying “contrary to 
current precedent, in order to trigger the bar in new 102(a) in our 
legislation, an action must make the patented subject matter ‘available to 
the public’ before the effective filing date.”142 The intent of the authors of 
the AIA were made clear on the floor of Congress in both chambers prior 
to voting. If a disagreement in this interpretation was present, it could 
have been addressed in the form of an amendment by another 
Congressman. While Congresswoman Lofgren did raise concerns and 
suggest an amendment, that amendment was never passed. Therefore, the 
intent of Congress was that “otherwise available to the public” lined up 
with the interpretation of the cosponsors of the bill. 
On one side, the Supreme Court alleges that Congressional addition of 
 
 137. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 139 S. Ct. at 633-34. 
 138. 157 CONG. REC. S5431 (2011); 157 CONG. REC. S1496 (2011).  
 139. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 632 (2019). 
 140. Id. at 634. 
 141. 157 CONG. REC. S1496 (2011).  
 142. 157 CONG. REC. S5320 (2011).  
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“otherwise available to the public” does not modify the preceding 
language in 35 USC § 102(a) and that the statute’s construction is the 
same as before the AIA. On the other side, Senator Leahy explicitly states 
that the draft of the new 35 USC § 102(a) was done in such a way as to 
“do away with precedent under current law” that private offers for sale 
act as part of the on-sale bar. Further supporting Senator Leahy is 
Representative Smith’s quote saying “contrary to current precedent” an 
action must be available to the public to trigger the new on-sale bar. These 
facts are in direct conflict with one another.  
It is clear that the main cosponsors of the AIA agreed that the addition 
of “otherwise available to the public” did away with the precedent of the 
pre-AIA 35 USC § 102(a) on-sale bar construction. This amounts to an 
overreach by the Supreme Court. The Court essentially ignores the intent 
of Congress and instead opts to replace the interpretation of the new law 
with the interpretation of the old law. The Supreme Court relied on 
precedent that suggested “a sale or offer of sale need not make an 
invention available to the public.”143 A sale or offer of sale that does not 
make the invention available to the public is a private sale. Congressional 
intent was to get rid of the private sale as a bar to patentability. Therefore, 
the precedent that the Supreme Court relied upon to make their 
interpretation was not valid. 
This leads to an analysis of what the Supreme Court thought the 
addition of “otherwise available to the public” was meant to do. The Court 
stated that the addition of “otherwise available to the public” was meant 
to capture “material that does not fit neatly into the statute’s enumerated 
categories but is nevertheless meant to be covered.”144 This interpretation 
is both broad and vague. Material that does not fit neatly into the statute’s 
enumerated categories is not discussed by Congress. This interpretation 
essentially gives the Judiciary free reign to decide whether material was 
“meant to be covered” or not. Essentially, the Judiciary has given itself 
the power to erase Congressional intent and replace it with Judicial intent.  
The Supreme Court claimed that “otherwise available to the public” 
was a broad catchall phrase. If the intent of Congress when authoring the 
statute was considered, it is clear that the interpretation of “otherwise 
available to the public” is actually narrowing, as it is meant to narrow “on 
sale” to only sales that are public. 
 
 143. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 139 S. Ct. at 633. 
 144. Id. at 634. 
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B.  A proposed change to 35 USC § 102(a) that removes private sales as 
a bar. 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 35 USC § 
102(a) and Congressional interpretation of 35 USC § 102(a) are at odds 
with one another. Since it is unlikely that the Supreme Court reverses its 
own opinion, the way to align the state of the law with the original 
Congressional intent is for Congress to amend the statute. This note 
recommends removing “otherwise available to the public” altogether to 
remove the apparent ambiguity and replace it with “to public” 
immediately after “on sale”. The statute would read like this: 
(a)  Novelty; prior art. A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-- 
(1)  the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed 
publication, or in public use, or on sale to the public before the 
effective filing date of the claimed invention; 
This change would unquestionably bring the meaning of the statute 
within the original intent of the AIA by removing secret or private sales 
from the bar to patentability under 35 USC § 102(a). This amendment 
would result in a phrase that is clear in its meaning.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Obtaining a patent is an expensive process, especially for a small 
business or entrepreneur that is dealing with a limited budget and limited 
cash flow. The AIA was intended to help entrepreneurs and small 
businesses. One way it was intended to accomplish this was by allowing 
flexibility in the form of allowing secret sales. Allowing secret sales 
would allow small businesses and entrepreneurs to increase their budgets 
and cash flows in anticipation of patenting. Large Fortune 500 companies 
have plenty of cash, so they can play it safe and file patents when there is 
an invention ready for patenting.  
Even more expensive than obtaining a patent is patent litigation. A 
patent owner will bring infringement claims to court with hopes of 
obtaining large amount of damages that will make their litigation costs 
worth it. When faced with a claim of patent infringement, a common 
strategy is to argue that the patent is invalid and should not have been 
granted in the first place. One way to do this is by applying one of the 
novelty bars described in 35 USC § 102. When Congress tried to narrow 
the on-sale bar to only encompass sales available to the public, it was 
essentially strengthening patents and making them harder to invalidate. 
As innovation powers forward in all fields of technology within the 
United States, many large companies have run into many patent litigation 
issues with smaller patent holders. Thus, there was an incentive for the 
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large companies to push forward questions regarding the on-sale bar after 
the implementation of the AIA in the Judiciary, as the old interpretation 
of the statute was more beneficial to them. 
The Supreme Court ultimately decided the interpretation of 35 USC § 
102(a) in Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., where it 
decided that the addition of “otherwise available to the public” was not 
intended to change the meaning of the statute. However, records from the 
floor of both chambers of Congress suggest that Congress did in fact 
intend for the addition of “otherwise available to the public” to remove 
private or secret sales from the on-sale bar. When considering these 
statements, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court incorrectly 
interpreted the statute. A simple Congressional amendment to the statute 
by changing “on sale” to “on sale to the public” could harmonize the 
interpretation of the statute with the intent of Congress, but this time in a 
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